State v. Stone Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 43444 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-25-2016
State v. Stone Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43444
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Stone Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43444" (2016). Not Reported. 2675.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2675
1 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #5867 
 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8712 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 334-2712 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43444 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-17534 
v.     ) 
     ) 
DANIEL BERNARD STONE, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Following a jury trial, a jury found twenty-six-year-old Daniel Bernard Stone guilty 
of felony grand theft by possession of stolen property.  The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed.  On appeal, Mr. Stone asserts the 
district court abused its discretion when it imposed his sentence. 
 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Boise Police Department officers received information about a possible stolen RV 
at a RV park, and that Mr. Stone and his brother, Neeko Stone, were possible suspects.  
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(Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.)1  Officer Evans noticed an Airstream RV in 
the park, and the park manager stated her records showed it belonged to Neeko Stone.  
(PSI, p.3.)  The RV’s plates did not return to the Airstream RV.  (PSI, p.3.)  While the 
police confirmed the VIN on the stolen RV with the Airstream dealership that had 
reported the theft, Mr. Stone and his brother arrived at the scene.  (PSI, p.3.)  They 
were detained and transported for interviews.  (PSI, p.3.)  Officers opened the RV and 
found stolen property inside.  (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Stone stated that he was homeless, having been recently kicked out of his 
parent’s place for using drugs and not getting a job.  (PSI, p.3.)  He stated that the RV 
belonged to “Nick,” who Mr. Stone had met at a bar.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Stone initially 
denied his brother had been at the RV before changing his story, and denied knowing 
any of the property had been stolen.  (PSI, p.3.)   
Mr. Stone’s brother stated he and Mr. Stone had been living at the RV for the 
past week-and-a-half, and the RV belonged to “Russ.”  (PSI, p.3.)  He stated he and 
Mr. Stone found the RV park and coordinated with Russ to park the RV there.  (PSI, 
pp.3-4.)  The brother denied knowing any of the property had been stolen.  (PSI, p.4.)  
Mr. Stone then stated the owner of the RV was one Nicholas Russell, and admitted to 
living in the RV for the past week-and-a-half.  (PSI, p.4.) 
The State charged Mr. Stone by Information with one count of grand theft by 
possession of stolen property, felony, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(4), 18-
2407(1), 18-2409 and 18-204.  (R., pp.46-47.)   Mr. Stone entered a not guilty plea.  
                                            
1 All citations to the Presentence Report refer to the 277-page PDF version, 
including attachments. 
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(R., p.50.)  Following a jury trial, the jury found Mr. Stone guilty of grand theft by 
possession of stolen property.  (R., pp.75-82, 131.)   
 At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a 
unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed.  (R., p.132.)  Mr. Stone 
recommended the district court retain jurisdiction, have him screened for drug court,2 or, 
if the district court imposed sentence, impose a unified sentence of seven years, with 
one year fixed.  (R., p.132.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, 
with two years fixed.  (R., pp.132-37.)  
 Mr. Stone filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s Judgment of 
Conviction and Commitment.  (R., pp.141-45.)   
 Mr. Stone also filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35.  
(R., pp.149-50.)  The district court denied the motion.  (R., p.160.)  On appeal, 
Mr. Stone does not challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to reconsider 
sentence.3 
 
                                            
2 The State suggested Mr. Stone was not eligible for drug court because he was facing 
a separate felony crime of violence charge for aggravated battery at the time.  (See 
Tr., June 18, 2015, p.146, Ls.16-22; PSI, pp.10-11.) 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the 
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the 
presentation of new information.”  Id. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten 
years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Stone following his conviction for grand theft by 
possession of stolen property? 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten 
Years, With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Stone Following His Conviction For Grand 
Theft By Possession Of Stolen Property 
 
Mr. Stone asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his 
unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, because his sentence is excessive 
considering any view of the facts.  The district court should have instead followed 
Mr. Stone’s recommendations by retaining jurisdiction or imposing a lesser sentence. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving “due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest.”  State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).   
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.”  State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Mr. Stone does not assert that his sentence exceeds the 
statutory maximum.  Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Stone 
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive 
considering any view of the facts.  Id.  The governing criteria or objectives of criminal 
punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public 
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
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wrongdoing.  Id.  An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence . . . 
consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.”  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 
(2007).  The reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be 
the defendant’s probable term of confinement.”  Id. 
Mr. Stone submits that, because the district court did not give adequate 
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is 
excessive considering any view of the facts.  Specifically, the district court did not 
adequately consider his substance abuse problems.  The Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized substance abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence 
to be excessive.  See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).  Mr. Stone reported 
he had used alcohol, marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, synthetic 
cannabinoids, and prescription medications.  (PSI, pp.14-15.)  He stated that marijuana 
was his drug of choice, that he smoked marijuana almost every day, and that he felt he 
had a problem with his use of drugs.  (PSI, p.15.)  In his GAIN-I Recommendation and 
Referral Summary (GRRS), Mr. Stone, based on his self-reported symptoms, was 
diagnosed with alcohol abuse, amphetamine abuse, and cannabis abuse.  (PSI, pp.158-
59.)    
The GRRS recommended Level 1 outpatient treatment for Mr. Stone.  (PSI, 
p.165.)  While the GRRS indicated that Mr. Stone’s responses indicated no or minimal 
motivation for treatment, Mr. Stone reported he was “about 100% ready to remain 
abstinent.”  (PSI, p.162.)   During the presentence investigation, Mr. Stone wrote, “[a]t 
this time I have desire to use any drugs.  I am determined to maintain full time 
employment and to raise my daughter.”  (PSI, p.15.) 
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The district court also did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Stone’s difficult 
early childhood.  During the presentence investigation, Mr. Stone reported he did not 
have many memories from when he was under eight years old, outside remembering a 
lot of foster homes and moving around.  (PSI, p.12.)  After he was adopted, he had a 
good family.  (PSI, p.12.)  However, Mr. Stone’s GRRS noted that, while he did not 
report any past sexual abuse, information provided in a previous presentence report 
indicated Mr. Stone was molested as a child.  (See PSI, p.164.)   
The previous presentence report stated that Mr. Stone was born in Washington 
State and raised by parents who abused drugs and alcohol.  (PSI, p.251.)  Mr. Stone 
was then placed in foster care at the age of four or five, and remained in foster care until 
his adoption when he was eight-and-one-half years old.  (PSI, p.251.)  Mr. Stone’s 
adoptive father stated that Mr. Stone had been molested as a child and never knew his 
biological father.  (See PSI, p.251.)  Mr. Stone’s adoptive father further reported 
Mr. Stone had been adopted because his biological mother was unable to care for him.  
(See PSI, p.251.)  Mr. Stone’s biological mother once drugged Mr. Stone to make him 
appear mentally and physically handicapped in an attempt to obtain money for his care.  
(See PSI, p.251.)  At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Stone’s counsel asserted that “while 
[Mr. Stone] indicated in his PSI he had a good life with his adoptive parents, I think you 
can tell from prior things there may have been some other trauma in his life, some other 
biological factors that may have led to his drug addiction and criminal thinking . . . .”  
(Tr., June 18, 2015, p.145, Ls.15-20.) 
Further, the district court did not adequately consider how Mr. Stone’s age made 
him more amenable to treatment and programming.  About seven years before the 
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instant offense, when Mr. Stone was eighteen years old, he was convicted of felony 
burglary.  (See PSI, pp.5-6, 10.)  During the sentencing hearing, Mr. Stone’s counsel 
discussed what happened next:  
So what we did is took an 18-year-old kid.  He tried on probation and 
didn’t do well.  He was sent on a rider.  He did a rider.  He did well enough 
on the rider to be reinstated on probation and then he continued to have 
issues.  He eventually was sent to the prison.  Did the therapeutic 
community still at a very young age before theoretically his brain was fully 
developed.  And ended up after some parole violations topping out 
his sentence. 
 
(Tr., June 18, 2015, p.142, L.22 – p.143, L.6; see PSI, pp.10-11.)   
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Stone’s counsel explained that “Judge Copsey will 
tell you in her courtroom repeatedly that a male brain typically does not fully develop 
until they are about 25.”  (Tr., June 18, 2015, p.142, Ls.19-22.)  Mr. Stone’s counsel 
asserted, “I think [Mr.] Stone is at an age now where a rider would do him some good 
because he would get some programming with what is most likely as close to a fully 
formed brain as he is going to get.”  (Tr., June 18, 2015, p.143, L.22 – p.144, L.1.)  
According to Mr. Stone’s counsel, “[w]hen [Mr. Stone] was 18, he wasn’t ready for any 
of that programming but I believe he is ready now.  And I believe he needs it if we want 
to get him on the right track.”  (Tr., June 18, 2015, p.144, Ls.2-5.)   
The district court did not adequately consider the above mitigating factors.  Thus, 
Mr. Stone asserts the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his unified 
sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, because his sentence is excessive 
considering any view of the facts.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the above reasons, Mr. Stone respectfully requests that this Court reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded 
to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 25th day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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